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Abstract Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves, relation-
ships between tonnes of emissions abated and the CO2 (or
greenhouse gas (GHG)) price, have been widely used as
pedagogic devices to illustrate simple economic concepts
such as the benefits of emissions trading. They have also
been used to produce reduced-form models to examine
situations where solving the more complex model underlying
the MAC is difficult. Some important issues arise in such
applications: (1) Are MAC relationships independent of what
happens in other regions?, (2) are MACs stable through time
regardless of what policies have been implemented in the
past?, and (3) can one approximate welfare costs from
MACs? This paper explores the basic characteristics of
MAC and marginal welfare cost (MWC) curves, deriving
them using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy
Analysis model. We find that, depending on the method
used to construct them, MACs are affected by policies
abroad. They are also dependent on policies in place in the
past and depend on whether they are CO2-only or include all
GHGs. Further, we find that MACs are, in general, not
closely related to MWCs and therefore should not be used to
derive estimates of welfare change. We also show that, as
commonly constructed, MACs may be unreliable in repli-
cating results of the parent model when used to simulate
GHG policies. This is especially true if the policy simu-
lations differ from the conditions under which the MACs
were simulated.
Keywords Climate policy . Economic cost . Greenhouse
gas emissions reductions .Marginal abatement cost
1 Introduction
Marginal abatement cost curves (MACs), relationships
between tonnes of emissions abated and the carbon dioxide
(CO2) or greenhouse gas (GHG) price, have been the
subject of many studies. In 1998, Ellerman and Decaux
produced a much-used set of MACs from an early version
of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis
(EPPA) model. The EPPA model has since evolved a great
deal [1], leading us to consider the re-estimation of a set of
new MACs that better represent abatement costs as we now
understand them given the advances and improvements we
have made in modeling global greenhouse gas emissions.
During this process, a number of issues have arisen: the
stability of MACs to policies abroad, stability over time and
dependency of MACs on previous policies, using MACs as
a measure of welfare, and the inclusion of all GHGs. This
paper explores these issues and offers sets of updated
MACs from the EPPA model that analysts may find useful
under some conditions as well as some cautions on their
use.
Marginal abatement cost refers to the cost of eliminating an
additional unit of emissions. Total abatement cost is simply
the sum of the marginal costs, or the area under the MAC
curve. A MAC curve for CO2 emissions abatement can be
constructed by plotting CO2 prices (or equivalent CO2 taxes)
against a corresponding reduction amount for a specific time
and region [2]. Construction of MACs involves multiple runs
of a model to get different price–quantity pairs. MAC curves
can be constructed for a single GHG or a combination GHGs
if one has a weighting system for trading among them such
as the Global Warming Potential (GWP) index. MACs have
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been widely used as pedagogic devices to illustrate simple
economic concepts such as the benefits of emissions trading.
They have also been used to produce reduced-form models
to examine situations where solving the more complex
model underlying the MAC is difficult.
Ellerman and Decaux [2] and Klepper and Peterson [3] are
two of the most commonly cited MAC studies. Ellerman and
Decaux investigated the robustness of MACs with respect to
different levels of abatement among regions and different
scopes of emission trading. According to their definition,
robustness refers to whether the MAC is virtually the same
whatever the reductions of other countries. Klepper and
Peterson also explored the robustness issue, arriving at
somewhat different conclusions than Ellerman and Decaux.
Issues not explored by these previous authors include the
stability of the MACs over time and closely related path
dependency, whether measures of welfare can be derived from
MACs, and the implications of expanding MACs to include
all GHGs. MACs may change over time as a result of
technological opportunities and resources and other condi-
tions that may differ over time. By path dependency we mean
specifically: Does aMAC constructed for a country in period t
=n depend on GHG policies implemented in periods t=0
through t=n−1? Many analyses, such as those that seek to
demonstrate the potential benefits of emissions trading, must
interpret MACs as equivalent to marginal welfare cost
(MWC) curves. Since the EPPA model includes an explicit
evaluation of welfare change, we are able to construct direct
measures of MWC from the EPPA runs and compare them to
MACs. Finally, since the early work of Ellerman and Decaux
[2] and Klepper and Peterson [3], the importance of
considering non-CO2 GHGs in the design of policy has
been realized and so we consider how that inclusion changes
the basic shape of estimated MACs.
In Section 2, we describe the version of the EPPA model
used here and construct MACs for a set of core cases. In
Section 3, we also test the stability of MACs to policies
abroad following protocols developed by Klepper and
Peterson [3]. In Section 4, we explore issues that were not
investigated by Ellerman and Decaux or Klepper and
Peterson, including stability over time and path dependency,
the relationship of MACs to MWCs, and the inclusion of all
GHGs in a policy. Section 5 then takes into account all the
issues previously discussed to develop a set of MACs that, if
one must rely on them, are derived under conditions that are
relevant to current policy discussions. Section 6 offers
conclusions and cautions on the use of MACs.
2 The EPPA Model
To construct the MAC curve, we use version 4 of the MIT
EPPA model. The standard version of the EPPA model is a
multi-region, multi-sector recursive–dynamic representation
of the global economy [1]. In a recursive–dynamic solution,
economic actors are modeled as having “myopic”
expectations.1 This assumption means that current period
investment, savings, and consumption decisions are made
on the basis of current period prices. This version of the
model is applied below.
The level of aggregation of the model is presented in
Table 1. Each country/region includes detail on economic
sectors (agriculture, services, industrial and household
transportation, energy-intensive industry) and a more
elaborated representation of energy sector technologies.
The model includes representation of abatement of both
CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (CH4, N2O,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and SF6). For non-
CO2 gases, calculations consider both the emissions
mitigation that occurs as a by-product of actions directed
at CO2 and reductions resulting from gas-specific control
measures.
When emissions constraints on certain countries, gases,
or sectors are imposed in a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model such as EPPA, the model calculates a shadow
value of the constraint which is interpretable as a price that
would be obtained under an allowance market that
developed under a cap and trade system. Those prices are
the marginal costs used in the construction of MAC curves.
They are plotted against a corresponding amount of
abatement, which is the difference in emissions levels
between an unconstrained business-as-usual reference case
and a policy-constrained case. The solution algorithm of the
EPPA model finds least-cost reductions for each gas in each
sector, and if emissions trading is allowed, it equilibrates
the prices among sectors and gases (using GWP weights).
This set of conditions, often referred to as “what” and
“where” flexibility, will tend to lead to least-cost abatement.
The results depend on a number of aspects of model
structure and particular input assumptions that greatly
simplify the representation of economic structure and
decision making. For example, the difficulty of achieving
any emissions path is influenced by assumptions about
population and productivity growth that underlie the no-
policy reference case. The simulations also embody a
particular representation of the structure of the economy,
including the relative ease of substitution among the inputs
to production and the behavior of consumers in the face of
changing prices of fuels, electricity, and other goods and
services. Further critical assumptions must be made about
1 The EPPA model can also be solved as a forward looking model [4].
Solved in that manner, the behavior is very similar in terms of
abatement and CO2-e prices compared to a recursive solution with the
same model features. However, the solution requires elimination of
some of the technological alternatives.
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the cost and performance of new technologies and what
might limit their market penetration. Alternatives to
conventional technologies in the electric sector and in
transportation are particularly significant.
We construct a set of “core” cases that assume all
countries and regions pursue the same policy, which
reduces CO2 emissions by 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%,
40%, or 50% below the reference no-policy level in all time
periods. The seven points on each of the MAC curves
represent these seven reduction levels, and the absolute
reductions resulting from each level can be read off of the
x-axis of the graphs. The policy starts in 2010 and remains
the same through 2050. So a 50% policy means that
beginning in 2010 and each year thereafter, emissions must
be reduced by 50% below reference. To focus on the
domestic costs of abatement in each region, there is no
emissions trading among regions/countries, but implicitly a
trading system operates within each region/country. All
marginal costs are expressed as 2005 dollars per tonne of
CO2, and the quantities of CO2 emissions reduced are in
million metric tonnes of CO2. MACs are snapshots of costs
at a particular point in time and change over time. To reflect
this, Fig. 1 shows the MACs that result from these “core”
assumptions for three different time periods (2010, 2020,
and 2050) for USA, European Union, and Japan.
A striking result in Fig. 1 is that the later-year MACs are
lower than earlier-year MACs, and this is especially
pronounced in the 2050 MAC. In general, later-year MACs
have a flatter shape, sometimes even an S-shape or step
function. The result is due to (1) the availability of more
technological options after 2020 and (2) path dependency
which will be demonstrated more directly in Section 4.1.
Several of the advanced electric generation options—those
that feature CCS—are promising but are at a stage of
development where most believe it would take something
like a decade to get even a large-scale demonstration
project completed. Thus, while EPPA has these technolo-
gies in the model, they are simply prohibited from entry
until 2025 at the earliest. Thus, they have no effect on the
MACs in 2010 and 2020.
As we will see in later sections, path dependency is playing
a large role in the shape of the MAC in later years, and so this
simulation design where high levels of abatement are
simulated from 2010 onward, while useful in demonstrating
behavior of the model, is generally not very realistic. Most
policy proposals envision a gradual tightening of the reduction
over time to avoid unnecessarily high near-term costs. Or
policies envision banking and borrowing—allowing agents to
reallocate reductions through time in an economically rational
way to again avoid excessive near-term costs.
Table 1 EPPA model details
aSpecific detail on regional
groupings is provided in Paltsev
et al. [1]
Country or regiona Sectors Factors
USA Non-energy Capital
Canada Agriculture Labor
Japan Services Crude oil resources
European Union+ Energy-intensive products Natural gas resources
Australia and New Zealand Other industries products Coal resources
Eastern Europe Transportation Shale oil resources
Former Soviet Union Household transportation Nuclear resources
India Energy Hydro resources
China Coal Wind/solar resources
Indonesia Crude oil Land
Higher-income East Asia Refined oil
Mexico Natural gas
Central and South America Electric: fossil
Middle East Electric: hydro
Africa Electric: nuclear
Rest of World (ROW) Electric: solar and wind
Electric: biomass
Electric: gas combined cycle
Electric: gas with CCS
Electric: coal with CCS
Oil from shale
Synthetic gas
Liquids from biomass
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3 Stability to Policies Abroad
One issue explored by Ellerman and Decaux [2] was the
stability of MACs to policies abroad. They found that the
EPPA-based curves were very stable and therefore robust to
other countries’ behaviors. A later paper by Klepper and
Peterson [3] challenged this stability using a different CGE
model (DART). They attributed the shifts in national MAC
curves to the changes in energy prices resulting from
different global abatement levels. The difference in the
approaches is a matter of defining the baseline. Emissions
in a particular country, the USA for example, change
depending on the policies abroad as those policies affect
energy prices and have trade effects. The baseline from
which to calculate the cost of reductions within the USA
can either remain unchanged, always using the original
emissions level resulting from original assumptions about
policies abroad, or can change to represent the new
emissions levels that result from changing policies abroad.
The Klepper and Peterson approach always uses the
original baseline, and as a result, a certain reduction in the
USA would require a higher price (a shift of MAC) if the
rest of the world had already acted and changed energy
prices. The Ellerman–Decaux approach uses a baseline that
changes depending on the policy abroad, and as a result, the
cost of a particular reduction is stable to policies abroad.
Klepper and Peterson found a shifting MAC when they
held the baseline unchanged but obtained a similar result to
Ellerman and Decaux when they changed the baseline.
There are actually additional ways to design the MAC
construction. For example, one approach is to estimate each
country’s abatement curve when all other countries are
doing nothing, and then any terms of trade effects would be
due only to actions within the country.
In our view, which approach to use depends on how one
sees policy developing and how results from such an exercise
might be used. If the country of interest, for example the USA,
has remained out of an international agreement while other
countries have committed to a clear policy, then the USA
baseline should be the emissions that result in the USA given
that specific international policy (i.e., USA does not partici-
pate in the policy but is affected by the actions of other
countries). The MAC should then refer to reductions below
that baseline, and the international policy should not be
changed while constructing the MAC. This first case is that of
a country considering unilateral policy action given that they
know what policy the rest of the world is pursuing. The
country’s reference should include the fact that other countries
are committed to pursuing policies and take into account
whatever impacts those policies have on energy markets. One
would not want to have additional trade effects represented in
either the position or the slope of the MAC.
Different situations may arise when a country is involved
in multilateral negotiations. In such a situation, the baseline
a country is working from likely reflects no additional
action by others, as all countries would impose a policy
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Fig. 1 MACs in 2010, 2020, and 2050 for the “core” scenario when the reduction policy is started in 2010 (points represent 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%,
30%, 40%, and 50% reductions)
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simultaneously. However, if the country has proposed
additional cuts for itself and one would like to evaluate
the costs of different levels of abatement in that country,
then one would like a MAC that was shifted to represent
other countries’ proposed policies.2
How much do these different experimental designs affect
the MAC? We demonstrate these differences with the EPPA
model by creating three cases in which the USA does either
a 0%, 1%, 5%, or 10% reduction in each of the years 2010,
2015, and 2020 while (1) the rest of the world does nothing
(case denoted as “US ONLY”), (2) other Annex 1 countries
reduce by 10% in 2010 and 2015 and by 20% in 2020 (case
denoted as “ANNX1”), or (3) the rest of the world reduces
by 10% in 2010 and 2015 and by 20% in 2020 (case
denoted as “ROW”). The two constructions of the MACs of
these policies are shown in Fig. 2 for the USA in 2020.
Using the Klepper and Peterson experimental design, the
abatement target is based on the baseline emissions in the
US-only case, and thus, the target is the same for all three
cases. When policies in other countries are considered,
energy prices fall which leads to higher emissions in the
USA (absent US policy). Therefore, the marginal cost of
achieving the same absolute abatement target in the US
increases as more countries participate in a policy. Similar
to their result, the percentage differences in the MACs are
quite large at low levels of reductions. Under the Ellerman
and Decaux design, each case uses different baseline
emissions so different absolute abatement targets result.
The more policies abroad, the higher US emissions (absent
US policy) so the greater amount of abatement required.
The curves for the three cases lie nearly on top of one
another, showing the stability Ellerman and Decaux found,3
but note that the cost of achieving a given percentage
reduction (e.g., 10%) in the USA is higher when more
countries have policies.
Like Klepper and Peterson, we find the difference in the
MACs produced using their method to be the result of
changes in energy prices caused by global abatement that
affect countries even though the emission trading systems
of countries are not linked. Mitigation policy abroad
reduces the world oil price as countries demand less oil in
order to meet their reduction targets. At lower oil prices,
countries would be inclined to use more oil which would in
turn create more emissions. Meeting a reduction target in
the face of this situation would therefore require a higher
CO2 price to make alternatives economically attractive. In
effect, the CO2 price needs to be higher to make up for the
drop in the world oil price.4 Another energy price playing
an important role is that of biofuels. More stringent
mitigation policy abroad also leads to greater global biofuel
use, and the resulting higher biofuel prices make reductions
more expensive.
A few general observations: (1) The different experi-
mental designs for constructing MACs can lead to fairly
large differences. (2) There is no universally correct
approach as it depends on how the MACs are being used
to inform decisions and what other ancillary information is
being used—whether shifts in the baseline are being
considered separately or not. (3) There are an unlimited
number of variants with more or less participation of other
countries at different levels of abatement, responding or not
to changes in the abatement level of other countries. (4) In
principle, one would want to produce a set of MACs for the
exact conditions one wished to examine but that entails
running the parent model many more times to produce the
MAC than would be necessary to simply examine the
policy with the parent model. These considerations thus
lead to the conclusion that any particular set of MACs can
at best only provide a rough approximation of the marginal
abatement cost in a particular country, and using them as a
basis for a reduced-form model has limits in that they will
not be completely consistent with different policies simu-
lated with the parent model.
4 Additional Issues
In this section, we consider other important issues that were
not investigated by Ellerman and Decaux or Klepper and
Peterson. We look at potential path dependency, the
relationship between MACs and welfare, and the inclusion
of all GHGS in a reduction policy. We construct MACs for
USA, Japan, European Union, China, India, and Middle
East to illustrate the effects of these issues.
4.1 Path Dependency
Path dependency refers to whether a MAC constructed for a
country in period t=n depends on policies in periods t=0
through t=n−1. In order to explore this issue, we
constructed MACs for 2050 for three cases that have
different time frames of policy implementation. The first
case is that used earlier where all countries are doing the
same policy (1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50%
reductions) each period starting in 2010. The second case
has all countries doing the same policy starting in 2050 and
doing nothing before then. The third case develops a more
2 The right set of MACs for a country is somewhat less clear when
international emissions trading is allowed. See Morris et al. [5] for
further discussion.
3 For additional comparison with the Ellerman and Decaux analysis,
see Morris et al. [5].
4 For additional examples demonstrating this result, see Morris et al.
[5].
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realistic path of emissions reductions from 2010 to 2050
that gradually increases and incorporates a delay for
developing countries. This path for developed regions
(USA, European Union, Japan, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand, Eastern Europe, and Former Soviet Union)
and developing regions (the rest of the regions listed in
Table 1) is detailed in Table 2.
Figure 3 shows the MACs for the three different cases
for the USA, European Union, Japan, China, India, and
Middle East in 2050. The differences in marginal abatement
costs between the three cases are substantial. The figures
clearly show that MAC curves for the same time period and
region with the same constraint have different shapes
depending on what policies were enacted in the past. The
stronger and longer the policy in the past, the lower the
marginal abatement costs for a given reduction in a given
year. This path dependency is a major explanation for the
flat and S-shaped 2050 MACs we saw in Section 2 and
repeated here.
Interestingly, the 2050 MAC derived from the Path
policy in Middle East does not begin near zero. Investigat-
ing further to find the source of the higher starting cost in
the Middle East, we found that leakage from the rest of
world was responsible. In particular, when we simulate the
Middle East with no policy while the rest of the world
follows the Path policy, emissions in Middle East are more
than double those in the original reference case (no policy
anywhere). This happens because energy activities are
relocated from other countries into Middle East, where
energy sources are located. This increased activity results in
significantly higher emissions in Middle East than in the
original reference case. Thus, even returning to the original
reference level emissions from this new higher level of
emissions involves significant cost. This is a fairly extreme
example of the Klepper and Peterson result. For the other
regions, a 1% reduction in 2050 costs nearly nothing,
regardless of what was done in previous years.
4.2 Measure of Welfare
Neither Ellerman and Decaux nor Klepper and Peterson
investigated the relationship of MACs to welfare, even
though many users of MACs integrate them to measure
“gains from trade” which is a welfare concept. In an
idealized neoclassical economic setting, first-order condi-
tions from consumer welfare maximization involve con-
sumers equating marginal welfare to the price of all goods
and similarly producers setting marginal cost to the price of
all goods. On that basis, the MAC and MWC curves should
be identical. However, actual economies represented in
computable general equilibrium models can diverge from
this partial equilibrium, first-best neoclassical world.
Goulder [6] showed generally that the CO2 price can be a
poor indicator of welfare when there are other distorting
policies. Metcalf et al. [7] demonstrate how CO2 pricing
can interact with pre-existing energy taxes to exacerbate
deadweight loss and raise the welfare cost of mitigation
policy. Paltsev et al. [8] illustrate the effects of tax
interactions and terms of trade effects diagrammatically
and show how it can result in emissions trading being
welfare worsening. Webster et al. [9] estimate welfare
benefits for emissions trading in a stochastic setting using a
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Fig. 2 Robustness using different constructions of MACs for 2020: a Klepper–Peterson construction and b Ellerman–Decaux construction
Table 2 Path policy
Year 2010 (%) 2015 (%) 2020 (%) 2025 (%) 2030 (%) 2035 (%) 2040 (%) 2045 (%) 2050 (%)
Developed 10 10 20 20 20 35 35 35 50
Developing 0 0 0 10 10 20 20 20 35
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reduced-form MAC model and the parent model and show
large differences. Thus, the fact that tax distortions and
terms of trade effects, the source of instability in Klepper
and Peterson’s [3] MACs, can also affect welfare estimates
is not a new result. In this regard, it is useful to consider the
welfare results from a CGE model to be driven by two
components: (1) the direct welfare costs of abatement that
can be measured as the integral under the MAC and (2)
indirect welfare effects that involve terms of trade effects,
interactions with other distortions, and saving and growth
effects from policies in earlier years. Paltsev et al. [8] derive
from a CGE model a method to estimate the direct costs
and show them to be nearly identical to the MAC
integration, but leaving a substantial residual difference
when compared to the total welfare cost. So while the MAC
may be a good estimate of direct costs, it does not capture
the indirect costs which are captured in the MWC.
Here we show divergence in welfare and marginal
abatement costs by estimating MWC curves that can then be
compared to MAC curves. To derive MWC curves, we note
that marginal welfare cost refers to the welfare loss associated
with abating an additional unit of emissions. For our welfare
measure, we use equivalent variation and we monetize it as a
change in aggregate market consumption for a representative
agent in a region. The CO2 price simulated by the model is a
marginal concept, directly related to the shadow value of a
Lagrangian maximization problem. However, the welfare
index monetized as equivalent variation is a total cost
concept—simply dividing the monetized welfare loss for a
particular policy level compared to no policy gives an
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Fig. 3 MACs in 2050 when the reduction policy starts in 2010, 2050, or follows a reduction path
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average loss rather than a marginal loss. We therefore
numerically approximate marginal welfare change by calcu-
lating the welfare change over a discrete but small change in
the abatement level and then use the average welfare change
over that small discrete change as an approximation of the
marginal welfare change.
To calculate the marginal welfare cost, we ran the seven
reduction policies (1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and
50% reductions) plus another seven policies requiring an
additional 1% reduction (i.e., 2%, 6%, 11%, 21%, 31%,
41%, and 51% reductions). We then calculated the change
in welfare resulting from the additional 1% of reductions
(for example, the change in welfare when comparing a 40%
reduction to a 41% reduction). To make this cost measure
comparable to the marginal abatement cost, we divided the
monetized welfare change resulting from an additional 1%
of reductions by the number of tonnes of CO2 comprising
that additional 1%. As a result, both the MWC and MAC
are estimated in dollars per tonne of CO2.
Figure 4 shows the MWCs and the MACs for the USA,
European Union, Japan, China, India, and Middle East in
2010 for the case in which all countries do the same policy
which starts in 2010. The basic result is that MWCs are not
the same as the MACs, and they differ in some not
unexpected ways given what has been learned in previous
work. For example, high fuel taxes in Europe and Japan are
tax distortions that are exacerbated by CO2 policy and so
the MWCs do not align very well with the MACs. The
marginal deadweight loss can be many times larger than the
direct cost when the CO2 price is low because of these tax
distortions and so we see especially at lower levels of
abatement that the MWC is quite high compared with the
MAC in these regions.
The USA has few such taxes and the MWC matches the
MAC more closely. For the USA, we often see terms of
trade benefits through the oil market, and so it is not
surprising that we see the MWC to be somewhat below the
MAC. Terms of trade benefits through energy markets also
likely contribute to lower MWC for other regions that are
net importers. For Middle East, we see the opposite—as a
large energy exporter Middle East faces terms of trade
losses that lead to MWC being far above the MAC.
We find that the difference between MWCs and MACs
for countries in 2050 is significantly greater than in 2010.
Welfare levels in 2050 are affected by the policy in 2050
directly (through marginal abatement costs), indirectly
through terms of trade and interaction with distortions
and, in addition, by previous year policies through effects
on GDP, savings, and investment. Thus, it is not surprising
that the marginal welfare cost in 2050 bears little
resemblance to the MAC. Starting the policy in 2050
eliminates the GDP, savings, and investment effects from
previous years, and the difference between the MWC and
MAC curves decreases significantly. Much of the very
different MWC behavior in 2050 can thus be explained as
the residual welfare effects of policies in prior years. After
adjusting for those residual effects by beginning the policy
in the year examined, the MWC and MAC are more
similar, but are still not equal.
In general, the existence of strong shifts in the magnitude
and sign of the indirect welfare effects—such as strong tax
interaction effects at low levels of abatement and then
possibly large terms of trade benefits at one point and large
terms of trade losses at another—likely explains the roller
coaster shape of the MWC curves that persist for some
regions.5 The goal here is to visually demonstrate that,
however one might fill in between the points we have
simulated, it is clear that there are large differences between
the MAC and the MWC.
Our general conclusion is that MWC and MAC curve
comparison confirms a substantial body of literature that
has shown welfare results from CGE models that cannot
easily be explained by the CO2 price. With a relatively
simple CGE model—a static one period setting, no tax
distortions, a small open economy, and/or no consideration
of policies abroad—one might expect to see a close
relationship between the MWC and MAC. But once in a
dynamic setting with changing policies abroad, trade
effects, and existing tax distortions, it is not surprising that
there is little correspondence. While this result is discom-
forting for MAC-based analysis, at the same time it offers
little comfort for CGE analysis. It is unlikely that we could
ever hope to accurately represent all of the various tax and
other distortions in an economy, yet these results show that
interactions with such distortions can dominate estimates of
welfare changes. The analysis thus is a general caution
about over-interpreting welfare results in a world that is
obviously not the idealized one of neoclassical economics.
4.3 Other GHGs
When Ellerman and Decaux and Klepper and Peterson
completed their work, many modeling exercises had not
formally introduced the non-CO2 GHGs. Modeling of the
non-CO2 GHGs has advanced, and policy discussions have
also recognized the importance of including them. We
therefore constructed MACs for policies aimed at all
GHGs, allowing trading among them at their GWP weights.
We apply the policy in which all countries pursue the same
reductions in all years starting in 2010 to all GHGs to create
the MACs in Fig. 5, which are compared with the MACs
from the CO2-only policy from Fig. 1.
5 For discussion of terms of trade effects in specific policy settings in
the US, see Paltsev et al. [10].
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The inclusion of all GHGs expands abatement opportu-
nities especially at low marginal abatement costs. Many
non-CO2 gases offer relatively inexpensive abatement
opportunities, especially when one considers their high
GWPs. These opportunities create a low shallow slope in
the initial part of the MAC, essentially shifting the MAC
outward. Once the non-CO2 gases are mostly controlled, no
more abatement opportunities exist for them and the
remainder of the curve involves mostly CO2 reductions.
5 If You Must Have MAC Curves
In this section, we make a best attempt to estimate MACs
under the type of conditions that are relevant to existing
policy discussions. We present graphs for a set of regions
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for 2020. In Online Resource 1, we provide these more
realistic MACs (in Excel format) for all regions for 2010
and 2050 in addition to 2020. The MACs were simulated to
include all GHGs trading at GWP weights. The path
dependency issue means we must consider carefully the
policy environment over the full time horizon. The
international policy environment is also of importance.
We thus follow the reduction path for the developed and
developing world previously detailed in Table 2. This path
involves gradual tightening of the policy over time with
reductions delayed in the developing countries. Each
country’s MAC is estimated separately, with other countries
at the Table 2 level in that year and prior years.
Constructing the 2020 MACs holds in place the 2010 and
2015 policy as described in Table 2 and simulates the
model for each MAC point in 2020 for each country.
The graphed MAC data are shown for several example
countries in Fig. 6. We illustrate them in two sections, one
section with a heavy line and one with a lighter line. The
different line weights are used to convey the idea that,
given the construction approach, some parts of the MAC
are more relevant than others for the year being considered.
The lower parts of the MACs are shaded more heavily for
2020. It seems less likely that a country would switch from
a mild or no policy in 2015 to a 40% or 50% cut in 2020. A
more realistic estimate of the cost of large cuts in 2020
should probably be simulated assuming deeper cuts in 2010
and 2015.
6 Conclusions
Many analysts have found marginal abatement cost curves
to be useful devices for illustrating economic issues
associated with greenhouse gas abatement. As pedagogic
tools, they follow in a long tradition in economics of using
graphical analysis of supply and demand curves to
represent markets for normal goods. In many applications,
the use of MACs has gone well beyond pedagogy. They
have been used as the basis for reduced-form models to
help illustrate likely CO2 prices, emissions trading, and
welfare costs of different abatement levels. For such
purposes, one would like to have some confidence that a
MAC-based analysis would provide the same result as the
parent model from which it was derived. Early analyses of
MACs under relatively limited conditions suggested a
somewhat surprising robustness. The specific test of
robustness was whether a MAC in one country was affected
by the level of the policy in another country. If the MAC is
affected by the level of policy elsewhere and the intention is
to examine emissions trading when the level of abatement
in other countries is changing in the analysis, then an
unstable MAC would clearly create inaccuracy in the
results. Later work formulated the test of robustness
somewhat differently and found more instability in the
MAC. Essentially, policies abroad create a shift in the
baseline for a country through changes in prices in energy
markets. If this shift is taken into account in the
construction of the MAC, as the earlier analysis did, then
the MAC appears stable. If, however, this shift is not
accounted for, then the MAC shifts and, especially at low
levels of CO2 prices, this can lead to very large errors (in
percentage terms) in predicted CO2 prices.
Is there a best practice in how to construct MACs? We
argue that it depends on how the MAC is to be used.
Whether, for example, the baseline change from policy
abroad is explicitly (or implicitly) taken into account will
determine which of the approaches to MAC construction is
more accurate. One approach to constructing MACs is to
simulate different levels of abatement in all countries at the
same time. This approach introduces the baseline shift into
the MAC of each country by gradually changing the MAC
slope at higher CO2 prices—when no one is abating, there
are no energy market effects from abroad but these become
bigger as the abatement level becomes stronger every-
where. This could be appropriate for some purposes—in
negotiations for example, if one imagined other countries
matching your offer on how much to abate, then a MAC
constructed in this manner would give you an accurate
measure of the CO2 price you could expect in your country.
In general, however, the baseline shift will introduce some
inaccuracy, and earlier analysis that demonstrated stability
did so under a special case that may not be appropriate to
the many uses to which MACs have been applied.
Given how MACs have come to be used, the robustness
of MACs in one country to changes in policy in another is a
relatively limited test. We also investigated their stability
over time and whether there was path dependence—the
extent to which a MAC in later years depended on the
abatement level in earlier years. We examined the relation-
ship of the MAC to MWC, and we extended MACs to
include non-CO2 GHGs. In general, these investigations
revealed far greater inaccuracies and instabilities in MACs
than the single period analysis of impacts of abatement in
other countries. These findings suggest caution in applying
MACs other than for the simplest of illustrations.
With regard to stability over time, MACs, at least those
derived from the parent model we used, changed greatly
from period to period. If this were solely the result of
changing technological opportunities over time, then a set
of MACs could be generated to represent each time period.
However, we found strong path dependence—MACs in
later years were strongly affected by the level of abatement
simulated in earlier years. Thus, MAC analyses that
consider dynamics of abatement—banking and borrowing
—must be considered suspect.
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Given a variety of previous analyses comparing welfare
derived from CGE models to measures of welfare derived
from a MAC analysis, we expected MACs to be a poor
indicator of MWC. What was surprising was how little
correspondence there was between the MAC and the
MWC. MWC was far above the MAC for some regions
and far below for others, and the relationship could change
substantially over the range of CO2 costs represented in the
MAC. MWCs were particularly sensitive to policies in
previous years. Upon reflection, this result is not too
surprising since saving and investment as it is affected by
policies in earlier years will obviously carry over to affect
welfare in later years as a completely separate influence
from any mitigation policy in the later year. Extending the
MACs to include other GHGs also substantially changed
the shape of the MAC, lowering the slope of the MAC at
low CO2 prices.
The use of the MACs has been popularized by
McKinsey & Company, which published their original
MAC for the USA in 2007 [11] and produced several
updates later, including MACs for other regions.6 Many
analysts have used these and other MACs. They offer an
easy to understand visualization of how costs depend on the
level of abatement. Unfortunately, unless one takes great
care in understanding the exact conditions under which
MACs are constructed and constructs them for the specific
use in mind, it is very easy to misuse them. By misuse we
6 For a detailed critique of the McKinsey approach, see Kesicki and
Ekins [12].
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mean exercising MACs under conditions where the results
they provide would differ substantially from the result one
would get from running the parent model. There are of
course great uncertainties in estimating costs, and different
parent models will yield very different results and so
perhaps the errors introduced by using simplified MACs are
swamped by differences among the more complex models
anyway. However, we can trace these differences to specific
structural considerations and feedbacks in the parent model,
and once one is aware of these processes and can model
them, it seems a mistake to simply ignore these effects to
avoid running the parent model. With cautions in mind, we
present in the final section of the paper MACs derived from
our EPPA model for various regions for 2020 under a
specific set of assumptions about how policy will evolve
over that time. In developing the MACs with an eye toward
the possible evolution of policy over the next few decades
—or at least the types of policy paths that are being
investigated as we write this report—they may provide a
rough indication of potential abatement costs if used
carefully.
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